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EVELYN A. MUIR, : 
Plaintiff/ : APPELLANT'S REPLY TO 
Appellant, RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
VS. 
AMEX LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation; : 
SANDRA M. JENKINS; LINDA J . 
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Defendants/ : 
Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Interspersed throughout Respondents' Brief are numerous 
factual allegations which are either without support in the 
record or mischaracterize the evidence which was presented 
at trial. Appellant specifically denies the following 
allegations which appear within Respondents* Brief: 
1. Contrary to Respondents' assertion on page 7 of their 
Brief, the Trial Court made no finding that "by the late 1970s, 
the relationship between Wallace and Evelyn Muir had become 
strained to the point that Mr. Muir discussed openly his wish to 
divorce her," nor did the Trial Court find that Appellant 
subjected Respondents to "abusive treatment . . • for years." In 
fact, there is no evidence in the record which even remotely 
resembles Respondents' present allegation of "abusive 
treatment." The fact that Appellant required the elder 
Respondents to contribute to family expenses during a period of 
economic hardship cannot reasonably be described as "abusive 
treatment." 
2. On page 7 of their Brief, Respondents purport to quote 
the beneficiary designation of the enrollment form. Appellant 
objects to Respondents1 characterization of the beneficiary 
designation, inasmuch as the form speaks for itself. Moreover, 
Respondents1 characterization is misleading in that the words 
"wife and children" are separated on the enrollment form from the 
designation of beneficiary itself, and the word "and" is not 
emphasized. Further, the grouping of the names on the enrollment 
form, as well as the dash, is significant. 
3. Contrary to the allegation of Respondents1 Brief at 
page 8, the Trial Court made no finding that Respondent Lowe was 
present at the time the enrollment form was executed, and 
Appellant denies that allegation. Much of Respondents1 
"Statement of the Facts" is merely argument, and does not contain 
citations to the record. 
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allowed it*" Respondents cite four sections of the record which 
supposedly support this allegation. The first cited portion of 
the record is unrelated to Respondents1 allegation. The second 
and third citations describe an incident wherein the Decedent 
allegedly asked Appellant if she wanted a divorce, and did not 
indicate that the Decedent wanted one. The last record cite 
generally supports the allegation but refers to a single incident 
involving only the Decedent and Respondent Lowe. 
8. With reference to page 14 of Respondents' Brief, the 
Decedentfs alleged "cold fish" statement cannot reasonably be 
construed to mean that the Decedent needed to "get away" from 
Appellant in order to read his newspaper (R. 504) . 
9. Respondents state on page 18 of their Brief that 
"Mrs. Muir had [at the time of the execution of the enrollment 
form] a house which was paid for, in addition to which she had 
income from other sources." These allegations are not only 
unsupported by the record (including the portion thereof cited by 
Respondents), they are false. At the time that the Decedent 
signed the enrollment form, he and Appellant owed approximately 
Twenty-seven Thousand Dollars ($27,000.00) on the purchase price 
of the home (R. 59, 110), and Appellant had been basically 
unemployed for well over a year due to her pancreatic surgery 
(R. 60) , her sole employment having been sewing coats on a 
part-time basis at her home during approximately a three-month 
period (R. 632-633). 
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r e s p e c t to the c o n v e r s a t i o n s r e l a t e d by Mark and Linda Muir, 
there i s no indicat ion that these conversat ions even concerned 
the same insurance p o l i c y which i s present ly at i s s u e , s ince the 
Decedent maintained more than one insurance p o l i c y during the 
re levant time per iod . Respondents1 br ie f at page 20. Further, 
none of the a l leged statements by the Decedent are probative as 
t o the Respondents 1 i n t e r e s t in the insurance p o l i c y v i s - a - v i s 
the Appel lant . Statements by the Decedent such as " f a i r " or 
"equally" might have simply referred to Respondents1 cont ingent 
i n t e r e s t s in r e l a t i o n to each o t h e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e the 
D e c e d e n t expec ted to o u t l i v e the A p p e l l a n t . D e p o s i t i o n of 
Evelyn A. Muir, 118; 18-20 (published at R. 9 3 ) . 
With r e f e r e n c e to Respondents1 Second Argument, Appellant 
submits that the l ike l ihood of a father d i scuss ing h i s insurance 
w i t h h i s c h i l d r e n i s n o t in i t s e l f s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l o w 
Respondents1 hearsay testimony under the c i rcumstances of t h i s 
c a s e , where the meaning of the Decedent's a l leged statements was 
ambiguous with respect to the material i s s u e . The factor which 
renders A p p e l l a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y a d m i s s i b l e in t h i s case i s the 
appearance of her handwriting upon the enrollment form, including 
the benef ic iary des ignat ion and the dash. This c l e a r l y meets the 
requirement of independent c o r r o b o r a t i o n and d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
Appel lant ' s testimony from that of Respondents. 
I t i s true that Appellant contends her testimony concerning 
h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h D e c e d e n t was a d m i s s i b l e and t h a t 
- 6 -
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circumstance or testimony other than that the Respondents1 names 
appear on the enrollment form. The Trial Court also stated: 
"That men will be taken to have meant precisely what they have 
said unless from the whole tenor of the instrument a definite 
meaning can be collected which gives a broader interpretation to 
specific words than their literal meaning would bear." 
(R. 673-674)• Similarly, in the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 12, it stated: "As proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence and based on the testimony presented at trial and the 
document itself Wallace Muir intended to leave the proceeds of 
the insurance policy to Evelyn, Sandra, Linda, Ginny, Deanna and 
Mark, equally . . . ." (emphasis added). 
The clear implication of these statements is that the Trial 
Judge construed the enrollment form as generally supporting 
Respondents1 position, which, Appellant submits was error because 
the form is facially ambiguous concerning Respondents1 status 
as beneficiaries. Such ambiguity is due to the existence of the 
dash, the grouping of Respondents1 names, and the fact that the 
beneficiary designation was actually written by Appellant, 
herself. Appellant submits that the enrollment form, on its 
face, supports Appellantfs position at least as much as 
Respondents1. Further, in dealing with a testamentary 
instrument, the Trial Court should have gone beyond the express 
terms of the document, if necessary, to ascertain the intent of 
the insured. 
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Respondents misconstrue this point in their Brief, at pages 
18-20. Respondents note that the Trial Court heard testimony 
concerning the circumstances surrounding the signing of the 
enrollment form, which is indisputable. However, the issue is 
the manner in which the Trial Court construed the enrollment 
form, and the weight which was accorded to that determination. 
Respondents admit that "The Court's findings were based primarily 
on the testimony produced at Trial . . . ." Respondents1 Brief 
at page 8 (emphasis added). Respondents thereby recognize that 
the Trial Court relied at least partially upon its interpretation 
of the document itself, which, if the document is facially 
ambiguous as Appellant contends, constituted error. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
APPELLANT TO TESTIFY AS TO WHAT SHE INTENDED THE 
WORDS UPON THE ENROLLMENT FORM TO MEAN 
Respondents do not contest the general rule that a scrivener 
may testify as to the meaning of ambiguous language within a 
testamentary instrument. Appellant's Brief at 19-21 and cases 
cited therein. Respondents merely observe that, where the 
scrivener is also a beneficiary, "the facts surrounding the 
purported execution of the will must be carefully scrutinized." 
Respondents1 Brief at page 20. Neither Respondents nor any of 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE 
DECEDENT'S BISHOP TO TESTIFY AS TO OBSERVATIONS 
HE MADE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS ECCLESIASTICAL DUTIES 
Appellant observes that Respondents' Brief mischaracterizes 
the context of the Bishop's observations which were made in this 
case. It was not a "casual observation," nor did "the witness 
merely look into the camper shell on a pickup truck." 
Respondents' Brief at page 22. Rather, the witness was called to 
the scene because of his ecclesiastic position (R. 519), and made 
his observations within the scope of his professional authority 
(R. 514). 
Respondents also assert, without supporting authority, that 
"A confession is a verbal communication . . . ." Respondents' 
Brief at page 22. While confessions are often verbal, Appellant 
submits that they are not always so. In fact, the cases cited on 
page 22 of Appellant's Brief indicate that a clergyman's 
observations are privileged if made within the scope of his 
professional capacity. The emphasis should not be upon the mode 
of communication, but upon its confidential nature. 
V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
CROSS EXAMINATION CONCERNING HYPNOTIC 
ENHANCEMENT OF RESPONDENT LOWE'S TESTIMONY 
R e s p o n d e n t s a p p a r e n t l y c o n c e d e t h a t q u e s t i o n i n g a s t o 
h y p n o t i c e n h a n c e m e n t of a w i t n e s s ' t e s t i m o n y i s g e n e r a l l y 
p r o p e r . R e s p o n d e n t s ' B r i e f a t p a g e 2 3 . H o w e v e r , R e s p o n d e n t s 
- 10 -
contend that it was "highly improbable that the refusal to allow 
questioning regarding her alleged hypnosis significantly affected 
the outcome of the case." Respondents1 Brief at page 24. 
However "improbable," Appellant should have been allowed an 
opportunity to examine the witness1 highly selective memory. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
As indicated in Appel lant ' s Brief , the only even arguably 
admissible evidence presented at t r i a l in support of Respondents1 
p o s i t i o n was that of Respondent Lowe, who claimed to have been 
p r e s e n t at the t ime the enrollment form was f i l l e d out . Even 
Lowe's t e s t imony does not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e t o t h e i s s u e of 
Respondents ' s t a t u s as b e n e f i c i a r i e s v i s - a - v i s the Appel lant . 
F u r t h e r , Lowe's t e s t i m o n y was r e p l e t e w i t h o m i s s i o n s and 
i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s which s imply cannot be ignored, including her 
i n a b i l i t y to account for the other p o r t i o n s of the enro l lment 
form which were f i l l e d out by Appellant (who t e s t i f i e d that Lowe 
was not p r e s e n t ) . Also , Lowe's purported reason for being in the 
home on the re levant date (a l l eged ly to help Appellant sew some 
c o a t s ) was i n c o n s i s t e n t wi th Lowe's o ther t e s t i m o n y , which 
indicated that the coats would have been completed s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
p r i o r to t h a t d a t e . N o t a b l y , Lowe f a i l e d t o m e n t i o n t h e 
i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y d u r i n g her t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h 
Appellant, wherein Appellant a l l e g e d l y s tated that there was no 
insurance (R. 260) . 
- 11 -
In t h e i r B r i e f , R e s p o n d e n t s c o n t i n u a l l y s t r e s s e d one 
i n c i d e n t of m a r i t a l disharmony, and t h e a l l e g e d f a c t t h a t 
A p p e l l a n t misled Respondents as to the insu rance p r o c e e d s . 
Respondents1 Brief a t pages 25-27. With reference to the l a t t e r 
a s se r t i on , i t i s simply i r r e l evan t to the issue of the Decedent's 
i n t e n t . In f ac t , one may well understand Appel lant fs re luctance 
to confide in Respondents given the i r subsequent conduct. 
With re ference to the a l l eged m a r i t a l disharmony, t h e r e 
simply i s no evidence in the record to suggest the inference tha t 
the Decedent intended to d i s i n h e r i t A p p e l l a n t , which i s the 
e f f e c t of Respondents 1 p o s i t i o n . A p p e l l a n t ' s sha re of the 
o r ig ina l insurance proceeds, according to Respondents, was about-
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), which would have approximately 
covered the cos ts of the Decedent's funeral , leaving Appel lan t 
with no savings, no s ign i f i can t source of income, a h i s to ry of 
s e v e r e h e a l t h p r o b l e m s , and a mor tgage of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
Twenty-seven Thousand Dollars ($27,000.00) owing on the family 
home. Considering the e n t i r e circumstances, the determination of 
the Tr i a l Court was so contrary to the weight of the evidence as 
to be manifestly un jus t . 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests that this Honorable Court reverse the 
Findings and Judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case to 
the District Court for entry of Judgment in favor of Appellant 
- 12 -
and against the Respondents for the entire amount of the 
insurance proceeds which are on deposit in the Trial Court. 
DATED this <L~-^/ day of December, 1989. 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
David Schwobe 
Mark C. McLachlan 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to B. Ray Zoll and Tom D. Branch, Attorneys for 
Defendants Jenkins, Muir, Lowe, Pfeiffer and Muir, 5300 South 360 
West, Suite 360, Salt Lake City, Utah 84123, this / day of 
December, 1989. 
Mark C. McLachlan 
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